As the effects of the Wall Street Crash took hold in the UK, the Labour Government appointed a Committee on Finance and Industry, better known as the Macmillan Committee, in November 1929. It sat for 15 months, hearing evidence from the country’s top bankers, economists (including Keynes) and representatives of industry, under the chairmanship of Hugh Pattison Macmillan, a Scottish lawyer and later Lord of Appeal. “It was charged with discovering whether the arrangements for banking, finance and credit, internal and international, were helping or handicapping trade and industrial employment. Its report, largely written by Keynes, was an elaborate and important account of British banking, credit and investment practices; but its recommendations were cautious, and by the time they appeared, June 23, 1931, had been almost overtaken by events.” [p.262, Britain between the Wars 1918-1940, Charles Loch Mowat]
The Conservative Party at the time represented the more traditional and orthodox view of economic theory. Analysing the Macmillan Committee’s conclusions Frank Pakenham of the Conservative Research Department notably refers to those of more left-wing or unorthodox views as “cranks” (although he himself became a minister in the Labour Government after 1945, and later, as Lord Longford, was known for his controversial views). But he was equally unimpressed with the Committee’s lacklustre proposals. Concluding his summary of the report, he wrote, “…it may be remarked that the reason the work the Macmillan Committee proved disappointing was that there was no sufficient conflict between those whom it regarded as its expert witnesses. Each of these in turn described, and by implication justified, their existing methods. The reformers were, on the other hand, too obviously lacking in practical experience of the system.” |
